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Abstract
Background and Objective: Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection represents a main cause of morbidity and mortality among
immunocompromisedpatients.ThisstudydescribesafatalepidemicofP.aeruginosathatoccurredinahematologyunitinItaly.
Methods: Retrospective cohort study, prospective surveillance, auditing, extensive testing on healthcare workers and
environmental investigation were performed to define the dynamics and potential causes of transmission. RAPD,
macrorestriction analyses and sequence typing were used to define relationships between P. aeruginosa isolates.
Results: Eighteen cases of infection were identified in the different phases of the investigation. Of these, five constitute a
significant molecular cluster of infection. A P. aeruginosa strain with the same genetic fingerprint and sequence type (ST175)
as clinical isolates strain was also isolated from a heavily contaminated triclosan soap dispenser.
Discussion and Conclusions: Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that patients became indirectly infected, e.g.,
during central venous catheter handling through contaminated items, and that the triclosan soap dispenser acted as a
common continuous source of P. aeruginosa infection. Since P. aeruginosa is intrinsically unsusceptible to triclosan, the use
of triclosan-based disinfectant formulations should be avoided in those healthcare settings hosting patients at high risk of P.
aeruginosa infection.
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Introduction
The Gram-negative bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa (P. aeruginosa)i s
frequently associated with hospital acquired infections. While the
nutritional versatility enables P. aeruginosa to occupy a variety of
ecological niches in healthcare settings (HCS), its powerful armamen-
tarium of virulence factors makes it highly pathogenic in susceptible
patients [1]. P. aeruginosa is capable of causing high morbidity and
mortality among immunocompromised patients [2], and it is a well-
known cause of outbreaks in oncohematology units [3–4].
Patient-to-patient transmission through contaminated medical
devices [5–7] and multi-vials drugs [8] is a well-established
mechanism of P. aeruginosa spreading in HCS. Some studies have
also emphasized the importance of the moist environment as a
reservoir of nosocomial P. aeruginosa strains [1,9]. Moreover, the
resistance of P. aeruginosa to a variety of chemical compounds,
including antibiotics, detergents, and hospital disinfectants facili-
tates its long-term persistence in the HCS and the spreading
among patients [1,6,9–12].
During the first week of June 2007, two patients died in a
oncohematology unit which had been opened since March 2006.
The patients were severely immunocompromised as the conse-
quence of chemotherapy for hematologic neoplasms. Clinical and
laboratory findings were consistent with fatal systemic infections
caused by P. aeruginosa strains sharing the same pattern of
resistance to cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and aminoglyco-
sides. To prevent further spreading of infections, on 6 June 2007
the local health authorities decided to close the unit and to transfer
patients and clinical activities to another hospital building.
The present paper reports the epidemiological investigation to
confirm the presence of the outbreak, to identify the source(s) of
infection, and to elucidate the transmission pathway(s). The report
has been written according to ‘‘The ORION statement: guidelines
for transparent reporting of outbreak reports and intervention
studies of nosocomial infection’’ [13].
Methods
Ethical statement
All data contained in the manuscript are obtained during the
epidemiological investigation commended by the Latium Regional
Heath Authority (RHA), in order to identify/contain an ongoing
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e17064epidemic cluster, to provide recommendations, to prevent new
outbreaks and to avert complications in infected subjects. For the
purpose of the current publication there was no information that
could identify the patient personally.
The approval of INMI Spallanzani’s IRB was not required since
we operated under emergency circumstance, in fact, the
investigation was commended by the RHA to contain an ongoing
outbreak among frail subjects. Individual written consents were
not obtained because of emergency circumstance (i.e.: potential
risk of death of already infected subjects due to complications and
the risk of further spreading of the infection) and because patients
never underwent individual intervention for the purposes of this
study but only according to their needs and clinical judgment.
Study design
Table 1 summarizes the timeline of the individual tasks of the
investigation, this includes: retrospective study, prospective
surveillance, look-back investigation, test on healthcare workers
(HCW), audit on infection control measures and environmental
investigation.
Retrospective study. Between 7 and 21 June 2007, a
retrospective study was carried out to confirm the presence of
the outbreak and to assess potential risk factors. For this task we
designed a retrospective dynamic cohort for multiple failure events
including all patients admitted between 15 March 2006 and 6 June
2007. Patients were enrolled the day of the first admission and
censored on 6 June 2007 or if they died. Enrolled patients were
considered at risk only while in hospital, and up to the first
evidence of P. aeruginosa infection which occurred in each one of
the admission(s) they had. Patients’ data about clinical
presentation, age, gender, time and place of hospital admission,
timing of central venous catheterization (CVC), timing of urinary
catheterization, timing of parenteral feeding and hematopoietic
stem cell transplantation (HSCT) were acquired from clinical
charts.
Data about P. aeruginosa infections were obtained from the
database which was part of the infection control system
implemented in the unit. According to this system, all patients
underwent routine microbiological sampling on admission (i.e.:
swabs from nasal, pharyngeal and rectal mucosa, swab from
central venous catheter insertion site, when present, and urine
cultures); additional microbiological tests were also performed
throughout the hospital stay, when clinically appropriate. All
positive tests, including antibiotic resistance phenotypes, were
systematically recorded.
We considered a failure event the microbiological evidence of P.
aeruginosa in a subject who had resulted negative at the routine tests
at the admission.
Prospective surveillance. The prospective surveillance was
performed to confirm the end of the transmission chain. For this
task we designed a prospective dynamic cohort for multiple failure
events including all patients admitted to the new hematology unit
between 7 June and 27 September 2007. All these patients were
screened both at time of admission and discharge according to the
same sampling scheme as the internal surveillance system (see
above).
Look-back investigation. In order to identify asymptomatic
cases who might have been missed in the retrospective study,
between 7 and 21 June 2007 all patients who had been admitted
between 14 February and 6 June 2007 (i.e. in the 16 weeks
preceding the closure of the unit) were contacted to be tested with
the same sampling scheme as the internal surveillance.
Tests on HCW. To explore the potential role of HCW in the
transmission of the infection, the personnel of the unit was asked to
undergo tests for P. aeruginosa colonization. Tests were performed
between 13 June and 19 July 2007 and included nasal, ear, rectal
and urethral swab (if male) or vaginal swab (if female).
Auditing. The audit on infection control measures was
carried out on July 2007 to assess potential breaks in infection
control measures which could have been occurred. In this occasion
all internal protocols were assessed and nurses were interviewed on
hand hygiene practices according to Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) guidelines [14]. In addition the medical
head of the unit and the nurse coordinator were asked about the
general running of the unit.
Environmental investigation. The environmental investi-
gation was conducted on 27 June 2007 to evaluate role of the
environment in the spreading of the infection. In this day the unit
was inspected and potential P. aeruginosa reservoirs were sampled.
Specimens were taken aseptically, using sterile gloves and vials or
swabs, depending on the sample. All the samples collected were
immediately shipped to INMI Spallanzani to be processed.
Clinical setting
The hematology unit comprised two different areas dedicated to
outpatients and inpatients, separated by a filter room (figure 1A).
The inpatients area consisted of 4 double rooms with in-side
bathroom, 2 nurse stations where drugs (apart from antiblastics) and
other medical devices were stored and prepared for use, a deposit
for dirty materials, 3 rooms dedicated to doctors and nurses (staff
Table 1. Time-line of the tasks.
Task Date Type of activity
Retrospective study Jun 7 to 21 Clinical chart review and internal data base analysis. All patients
who had been admitted between 15/03/2006 and 06/06/2007.
Look-back investigation Jun 7 to 21 Contacting and testing for P. aeruginosa.
All patients who had been admitted between 14/02/2007 and 06/06/2007.
Prospective surveillance Jun 7 to Oct 4 Microbiologic and clinical surveillance.
All patients admitted between 07/06/2007 and 27/09/2007.
Healthcare Worker Testing Jun 13 to Jul 19 Testing for P. aeruginosa.
Healthcare workers employed in the unit.
Environmental investigation Jun 27 Visual inspection of the unit and collection of environmental samples.
Auditing Jul 2 to 31 Review of internal protocols on infection control. Interview of personnel.
For each of the task the time and type of activity have been specified.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.t001
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staffed with 9 doctors, 15 nurses, and 3 auxiliary workers. Twelve
nurses were dedicated to inpatients care, and 3 to outpatients.
Case definitions
The following case definitions were used: (i) index case: the
subject who introduced the epidemic strain in the unit; (ii)
susceptible subject: a patient who was admitted without evidence
of P. aeruginosa at admission tests; (iii) prevalent case: a patient who
was admitted with evidence of P. aeruginosa;( iv) incident case: a
susceptible subject who became positive for P. aeruginosa while in
hospital; (v) probable case: an incident case infected with P.
aeruginosa with an antibiotic resistance phenotypes identical to
other confirmed cases and temporally related with other incident
cases; (vi) confirmed case: an incident case infected with a
molecular type of P. aeruginosa identical to another strain retrieved
from the environment or from another incident or prevalent case;
(vi) excluded case: an incident case which does not meet with any
of the above definitions.
Outcomes
For the purpose of this investigation we do not make distinction
between colonized and infected symptomatic patients. Infection
outcomes were: (i) survived: a cases who was still alive at the end of
follow-up or had died without evidence of P. aeruginosa infection; (ii)
died: a cases who died while infected and whose death was
attributable to P. aeruginosa infection.
Bacterial cultures
Microbiological culture tests on human samples were performed
at local level, and the results were communicated as soon as
available to the epidemiological team by the head of the unit.
Identification of isolates and antibiotic susceptibility tests were
performed with autoSCAN-W/A (W/A; Dade Behring Microscan
Inc., West Sacramento, Calif.) [15].
Positive cultures were sent to the INMI Spallanzani for further
analysis by means of the VITEK 2 system equipped with GN and
AST-N022 cards (Bio-Me ´rieux). Blood cultures were analyzed
with BacT/ALERT FN (Biomerieux). Search for P. aeruginosa in
Figure 1. Hematology unit. (A) Map of the unit. Areas for outpatients and inpatients are in yellow and blue, respectively. Crosses indicate the
location of patients with at least one P. aeruginosa isolate according to the case definitions (red, incident case; green, prevalent case; see text for
details). L1 to L4 indicate the sites from which Pseudomonas spp. were isolated: L1, soap dispenser; L2 soap dispenser; L3 and L4 water outlets. (B)
Drugs deposit and preparation room where the contaminated soap dispenser (L2) was placed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.g001
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by plating onto selective cetrimide (Pseudosel, Becton Dickinson)
agar plates. Swabs of environmental surfaces were directly plated;
water samples were concentrated on a 0.22 mm pore size filter
(Millipore), suspended in saline and plated for P. aeruginosa
counting; other liquid samples were appropriately diluted prior
to plating. Bacterial growth was assessed after 24 and 48 h
incubation at 37uC on Pseudosel agar, and expressed as colony
forming units (CFU).
VITEK 2 numerical identification codes, hemolysis on
Columbia-5% sheep blood agar plates, production of the
fluorescent pyoverdine pigment on Pseudosel agar, and antibiot-
ic-resistance (R-) profiles, were used for preliminary phenotypic
analysis of P. aeruginosa isolates. Resistance to cefepime, ciproflox-
acin, and gentamicin was used as marker of resistance to
cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides.
Epidemiological typing
In order to identify a confirmed case, the clonal relationship
between P. aeruginosa isolates were assessed by means of Random
Amplified Polymorphic DNA (RAPD) analysis, macrorestriction
analysis by PFGE, and Multilocus Sequence Typing (MLST).
The RADP analysis was performed as a rapid screening test in
order to provide the epidemiological team with information in the
early steps of the investigation. The macrorestriction analysis,
which is more reliable but also much more time-consuming, was
eventually used to confirm RAPD data. The MLST analysis was
performed to assign a genotype (ST) to the P. aeruginosa strains and
correlate it to the population structure of the species.
RAPD reactions were performed in a volume of 25 ml with
40 pmol each oligonucleotide and 40 ng genomic DNA, using the
Ready-To-Go PCR beads (Amersham). Oligonucleotide designa-
tions and their 59-39sequences are: 208, ACGGCCGACC; 228,
GCTGGGCCGA; 241, GCCCGAGCGG; 272, AGCGGGC-
CAA; 275, CCGGGCAAGC; 277, AGGAAGGTGC; 287,
CGAACGGCGG ERIC 1, ATGTAAGCTCCTGGGGATT-
CAC [16–18]. All PCR amplifications were carried out in a
9600 DNA Thermal Cycler (Perkin Elmer) under standard
conditions [16–18]. Amplicons were separated by 1.5% agarose
gel (Fisher) electrophoresis, stained with ethidium bromide, and
photographed under UV transillumination. The 100-bp ladder
(Biorad) was used as a molecular size standard.
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was carried out
following the Health Protection Agency protocol (http://www.
hpa.org.uk/), using a CHEF mapper (Bio-Rad, Segrate, Milan,
Italy). PFGE profiles were interpreted according to published
criteria [19], with a difference of four bands or less used to define
epidemiological relatedness.
Electrophoretic profiles were analysed with Bionumerics
software (Applied Maths, Sint-Martems-Latem, Belgium). The
BioNumerics analysis was performed using the Dice coefficient
and the unweighted pair group method of averages (UPGMA)
with a 1% tolerance limit and 1% optimisation.
MLST was performed according to the reference protocol with
sequencing primers for the housekeeping genes acsA, aroE, guaA,
mutL, nuoD, ppsA, and trpE, under previously described PCR
conditions [20]. Amplicons were purified by the QIAquick PCR
kit (Qiagen). Sequencing reactions were performed using the
BigDye Terminator kit, and products were run in an ABI PRISM
3100 Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystem). Nucleotide sequences
were assembled for both strands and compared with existing
entries in the MLST database (http://pubmlst.org/) for genera-
tion of allelic numbers and assignment sequence types (STs).
Statistical analysis
The time of retrospective cohort study (15 March 2006 – 6 June
2007) was divided into sixteen 28-day fractions (T1–T16) to define
the epidemic curve and calculate incidence rates with 95%
confidence intervals (95% CI).
Extended Poisson model [21] for recurrent events with gamma
distribution for inter-individual heterogeneity (gamma-frailty
model) was used to assess the association of potential risk factors
and the infection both in univariate and multivariate models. In
univariate analysis we estimated incidence rate ratio (IRR) with
95% CI and Wald’s test p-value for the association of infection
with all potential risk factors. Multivariate model was set up
including variables with IRR change $15% either as overall for
binary variable (i.e.: HSCT and gender) or after 10 exposure units
for continuous variables (i.e.: age, CVC, timing of urinary
catheterization and timing of parenteral feeding). Analysis was
performed using Stata Statistical software, version 11.1 (Stata-
Corp, Texas, USA).
Results
Retrospective Cohort study
During the time of retrospective cohort study (15 March 2006 –
6 June 2007) 78 patients were admitted for a total of 4592 person-
day at risk, and 10 incident cases (table 2).
The epidemic curve and the incidence rates according to the 16
time fractions (figure 2) shows that P. aeruginosa infections clustered
in two different time periods (T3–T9 and T15–T16), separated by
a time period (T10–T14) with no cases.
The first cluster consisted of 6 incident cases (codes 1a, 2, 3a, 6a,
4, and 3b; figure 2 and table 3) one of whom died (code 2); P.
aeruginosa strains isolated during this period showed heterogeneous
antibiotic resistance phenotypes (table 3).
The second cluster (T15–T16) consisted of 4 incident cases
(codes 9, 1c, 10, and 11; figure 2 and table 3). In contrast to the
first cluster, P. aeruginosa infections which occurred in the second
cluster were significantly more severe (3 patients died despite
prompt empiric antibiotic therapy), and the 3 lethal isolates shared
an identical antibiotics resistance phenotypes.
No spatial relations among cases were noticed in either period
(figure 1A and table 3).
Table 2. Characteristics of patients included in the study.
Retrospective cohort Prospective surveillance
Time period 15 March 2006
to 6 June 2007
7 June 2007
to 27 Sept. 2007
Time at risk
(day/person)
4592 403
No. of patients 78 29
Median age (IQR
a) 65 (50–73) 66 (58–73)
Male/female ratio 1.47 1.98
Main pathology (%) Cancer (86.0);
others (14.0)
Cancer (87.9);
others (12.1)
Median day of
stay (range)
22 (1–128) 13 (1–97)
Admitted as
prevalent cases
51
aIQR, interquartile range.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.t002
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association between infection and the duration of CVC (IRR after
10 days of catheterization =1.23; 95% CI 1.04–1.45; p=0.014)
and the duration of parenteral feeding (IRR after 10 days =1.36;
95% CI 1.04–1.79; p=0.024). The multivariate model showed
that only the duration of CVC was independently associated with
the risk of infection (IRR after 10 days of catheterization =1.43;
95% CI 1.05–1.95; p=0.022). Complete results of the risk analysis
are reported in table 4.
Prospective surveillance
Duringthetimeofprospectivesurveillance(7June–27September
2007) 29 patients were admitted for a total of 403 person-day at risk
(table 2). Throughout this period 2 cases of infection were identified;
one was a prevalent case (code 13 table 3) and the other was an
incident case with a very different resistance phenotype from the
cases previously occurred (excluded case; case 14 table 3).
Look-back investigation
Sixteen out of 20 eligible subjects were tested for the look back
analysis (4 patients were not available: 3 patients died and one did
not accepted to be tested). Among these 16 we identified 2 patients
who resulted positive to P. aeruginosa sharing identical resistance
phenotype of the 3 lethal incident cases observed in the second
infection cluster (table 3 cases 12 and 13); only one isolate from
case 13 was available for molecular analysis.
Tests on HCW
Tests for P. aeruginosa were done on 21 out of 24 HCWs, as 3 of
them refused testing. None of the tested HCWs resulted positive.
Audit on infection control measures
The audit of internal protocols showed good application of
infection control measures. Ten of the 12 nurses who cared for in-
patients were interviewed and reported good application of hand
hygiene. In particular, a part from the absence of alcohol handrub,
HCWs claimed to wash their hands with disinfectant soaps
contained in common soap dispenser (either clorexidine digluco-
nate 4% -Neoxidina ManiH- or triclosan 0.5% -LH Crema ManiH-
used in rotation of 3 months, figure 1B), and wear a new pair of
gloves each time they move to a new patient.
Environment cleaning protocols reported that all rooms were
cleaned by an external team that was also responsible for refilling
soap dispensers without direct supervision by HCWs.
When asked the nurse-coordinator and the head of the unit
excluded that drugs contained in multi-dose vials could have ever
been used.
Environmental investigation
On 27 June 2007, the unit was inspected and potential
environmental reservoirs were sampled. The inspection showed
that the unit was provided with water outlets and with a common
refillable soap dispensers (figure 1B). Environmental reservoir
sampling consisted of 29 different specimens taken from opened
disinfectant bottles, water outlets, sinks, soap dispensers, and
showers.
Microbiological investigation and P. aeruginosa typing
As shown in figure 1A (codes L1 to L4), of the 29 environmental
specimens that were investigated for P. aeruginosa contamination,
only 4 yielded visible growth on selective Pseudosel agar plates.
Bacterial identification of representative colony morphotypes from
each plate confirmed the presence of 5 different strains, i.e.: one
Pseudomonas stutzeri from the soap dispenser in the filter room
between the outpatient and inpatient area (code L1 in figure 1A);
one P. aeruginosa from the soap dispenser in the nurse station where
drugs and medical devices were also stored (code L2 in figure 1A
and 1B); one P. aeruginosa from the water outlet in patients room 2
(code L3 in figure 1A); one P. aeruginosa and one Pseudomonas
mendocina from the water outlet in patients room 1 (code L4 in
figure 1A).
Bacterial counts revealed heavy contamination (ca.
5610
4 CFU/ml) of the soap sample (code L2 in figure 1A and
1B), and much lower levels (6-to-8 CFU/ml) in both water
samples (codes L3 and L4 in figure 1A). The levels of Pseudomonas
stutzeri in soap sample L1 (figure 1A) and Pseudomonas mendocina in
water sample L4 (figure 1A) were ca. 10
3 and 5610
2 CFU/ml,
respectively.
The P. aeruginosa soap isolate (code L2 figure 1A and 1B) showed
the same phenotypic traits as all clinical isolates (table 3 codes 10,
11 and 13); all of them were haemolytic, yellow-green fluorescent
on Pseudosel agar, and showed similar multidrug-resistance
pattern (resistant to gentamicin and ciprofloxacin, intermediate
resistant to cefepime and susceptible to piperacillin and imipenem)
and VITEK 2 identification codes. The two water isolates were
also similar to each other, but differed from soap and clinical
isolates for several phenotypic traits, namely, pigment production,
antibiotic-resistance (sensible to gentamicin, ciprofloxacin, cefe-
Figure 2. Epidemic curve. The diagram shows the 10 incident cases (with respective codes) identified throughout the 16 time fractions (T1–T16) of
the retrospective cohort study. Red and blue squares denote died and survived patients, respectively. The incidence rate per 1000 person-days with
95% CI and the total time at risk is reported for each time fraction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.g002
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codes. Pseudomonas spp. other than P. aeruginosa were not further
investigated.
The typing analysis was performed on P. aeruginosa isolates: i.e. 5
clinical isolates from 3 patients (one blood culture and 2 sputum
cultures from patient 11; one sputum culture and one culture from
central venous catheter insertion site swab, from patient 10 and
patient 13, respectively), and the 3 environmental P. aeruginosa
strains.
Preliminary RAPD analysis with 8 different primers (figure 3A)
showed genotypic identity between the soap isolate (code L2 figure
in figure 3A) and available clinical strains (patient 10, 11 [blood
culture; other not shown] and 13 in figure 3A), but remarkable
differences between this group and the two water isolates (codes L3
and L4 in figure 3A). Likewise, the PFGE patterns of SpeI digested
genomic DNA from clinical isolates 10, 11 and 13 (figure 3B) were
identical to each other and closely related to the soap isolate L2 (2
bands difference; figure 3B). In contrast the isolates L3 and L4
from water (figure 3B) resulted unrelated to both clinical strains
and soap isolate.
MLST was performed to assign them an univocal and shareable
genotype (ST). Identical allelic numbers could be determined for
individual gene sequences in all strains, which made it possible to
assign the whole cluster to ST 175.
All the typing results concur to link the soap isolate L2 with
clinical isolates 10, 11 and 13 (confirmed cases).
Discussion
Based on the evidence collected along the investigation, it is
likely that 3 out of 4 incident cases that occurred between T15 and
T16 and the 2 cases identified during the look-back represent a
sole epidemic cluster (i.e.: 3 confirmed and 2 probable cases)
compatible with an environmental continuous common source of
infection within the unit.
Several evidence support this hypothesis. Firstly, T15 and T16
showed the highest incidence ever in the unit, infections during
this period were more severe than the previous ones and all the 5
cases were admitted in this period. Secondly, the retrospective
analysis of microbiological data showed that these 5 cases were
infected with bacterial strains sharing the same antibiotic
resistance phenotype. Thirdly, the spatio-temporal distribution of
cases was consistent with a common continuous source of infection
which all patients were exposed to regardless their location in the
unit and, in fact, no new case of infection due to the epidemic
strain occurred when the patients were moved to a different
hospital building.
The identification of the index case remains so far tentative. We
believe that the most probable index case might have been a 25-
year old man with acute myeloid leukemia and neurogenic
bladder needing of intermittent catheterization who had been
admitted as prevalent case (code 8 in table 3) one month before the
onset of the first incident case; he might have contracted P.
aeruginosa, in the form of asymptomatic bacteriuria, at home during
the urinary catheterization, and eventually contaminated HCWs’
hands or the environment while admitted.
Also the source of transmission was not definitively ascertained.
The use of multi-vials drugs [8] was unlikely since both the nurse-
coordinator and the head of the unit claimed that drugs in multi-
dose vials were never in use and no hint of this practice was found
through unit inspection and internal protocol review. Due to legal
issues, the investigation team could enter the unit only 3 weeks
after the closure. As P. aeruginosa can survive only in moist
conditions, no efforts were spent for sampling desiccated surfaces
such as doors, walls nearby the beds or trolleys. Therefore, it could
not be determined whether or not those surfaces were contam-
inated during the outbreak and if they might have played a role in
the transmission of the infection. Other potential environmental
reservoirs such as water outlets [22] and plumbing fixtures (e.g.
sinks and showers) [23] were excluded by the environmental
investigation.
The environmental investigation found that one of the soap
dispenser, where HCWs used to wash their hands, was heavily
contaminated with the same molecular type of P. aeruginosa as
confirmed cases which is compatible with an environmental
common continuous source of infection as above hypothesized.
With regard to the pathway of transmission, considering all
incident cases since the opening of the unit, a good evidence of
association between infections and duration of CVC was found.
This, along with previous findings, suggests that central venous
catheter handling by transiently contaminated HCWs might have
played a role in the spreading of P. aeruginosa during the epidemic
period.
A similar pathway of transmission has been also reported in
other published outbreaks related to soap dispenser contamination
[3,24,25]. Thus it may be hypothesized that, also in this
circumstance, the 5 clustered cases became infected through
HCWs’ hands contaminated during hand washing using the soiled
Table 4. Association between Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection and selected characteristics.
Risk analysis
Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis
Risk factor IRR (95% CI) p-value IRR (95% CI) p-value
Female gender 0.87 (0.24–3.07) 0.826 - -
Age in years at time of admission 1.35 (0.77–2.36)
a 0.288 1.93 (0.86–4.32)
a 0.109
Days of central venous catheterization 1.23 (1.04–1.45)
b 0.014 1.43 (1.05–1.95)
b 0.022
Days of parenteral feeding 1.36 (1.04–1.79)
b 0.024 1.02 (0.69–1.52)
b 0.904
HSCT in the previous years 2.33 (0.60–9.03) 0.219 3.91 (0.76–20.09) 0.102
Days of urinary catheterization 1.20 (0.78–1.84)
b 0.412 0.82 (0.41–1.63)
b 0.571
IRR= incidence rate ratio; 95% CI=95% confidence interval; HSCT= hematopoietic stem cell transplant.
aIRR is reported for 10 years increment of age.
bIRR is reported for 10 days increment of exposure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.t004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e17064Figure 3. Epidemiological typing of clinical and environmental P. aeruginosa isolates. (A) RAPD analysis with primers 208, 228, 241, 272,
275, 277, 287 and ERIC 1, as indicated on top of electropherograms. (B) PFGE analysis of P. aeruginosa isolates. The dendrogram was generated with
BioNumerics (Applied Maths) using the unweighted pair-group method with arithmetic averages (UPGMA) and the Dice coefficient. The similarity (%)
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Indeed, the reported optimal adherence to hand-washing practice
by HCWs may have even facilitated the spreading of P. aeruginosa.
Table 5 repots overall epidemiological outcomes at the end of the
outbreak according to the above hypotheses.
The specific way by which the soap dispenser became
contaminated is uncertain. We hypothesize that some breaks in
cleaning the soap dispenser before refilling it by the external team
may have been an important factor in determining contamination
and pathogen growth, possibly facilitated by the suboptimal
bactericidal activities of triclosan against P. aeruginosa [26].
Therefore we recommended to use safer soap-dispensers, such
as those provided with disposable not refillable cartridges with
anti-reflux valve, and to consider disinfectant soaps with highest
bactericidal activity such as clorexidine-based soap. Moreover,
we advised to implement the use of alcohol-based handrub, when
appropriate, as recommended by current international guide-
lines [27]. The new located unit complied with all these
recommendations.
In this study, molecular typing was essential to link clinical P.
aeruginosa isolates (codes 10, 11, and 13) with each other and with
the isolate from the soap dispenser (L2) and ruling out any
correlation with the other environmental isolates (L3 and L4).
Notably, such a link was preliminarily inferred by the results of
simple phenotypic tests, reviving the old notion that the
examination of phenotypic characters, such as antibiograms,
may help in the preliminary identification of an outbreak strain at
the local clinical laboratory level.
The association of P. aeruginosa ST 175 with an outbreak of
severe infections resulting from contamination of the hospital
environment highlights the importance of this ST as a nosocomial
pathogen. ST 175 does not belong to any of the main P. aeruginosa
clonal complexes, although pathogenic strains with this type have
previously been isolated from the sputum of cystic fibrosis patients
in Canada and UK, and from Intensive Care Units in Poland
(http://pubmlst.org/perl/mlstdbnet/mlstdbnet.pl?file=pa_profiles.
xml) [28]. The high virulence potential of our ST 175 isolate is
inferred by the rapid fatal outcome of infection observed for two of
three confirmed cases, despite the prompt initiation of empirical
antibiotic therapy.
Potential limitations of this study include: (i) only a limited
number of cases was investigated by molecular typing due to the
lack of preserved samples, which prevent us to clearly define the
index case; (ii) it is possible that the number of incident
asymptomatic cases of infections were underestimated, given the
design of the internal surveillance protocol; (iii) since the unit was
closed to prevent further spreading of infection, an observation-
based assessment of working procedures could not be performed,
therefore we cannot provide a more comprehensive description of
critical aspects of assistance; (iv) it could not be established the
potential role desiccated surfaces in the spreading of the infection.
Despite these limitations, this investigation highlights some
topical issues. First, prospective surveillance of emerging hospital
pathogens, such as P. aeruginosa, proved to be an effective measure
for prompt identification and containment of ongoing epidemic
clusters, as demonstrate by the small number of cases and short
duration of this outbreak. Second, this study highlights the
synergistic power of combining classical epidemiology with
molecular typing in tracing back the source of P. aruginosa infection
and defining its transmission pathways, also in cases of small
outbreaks and unprecedented environmental source. Third, the
outbreak strain was assigned to an uncommon sequence type
(ST175), which we showed to be highly pathogenic even among
non-cystic fibrosis patients.
We believe that researchers should be encouraged to publish
outbreak reports in HCS. In fact, as other observational studies,
outbreak reports may contribute to a better understating of
infection spreading and dynamics in HCS, and provide essential
information to compare different approaches for preventing new
events and managing ongoing ones. The increasing interest for
outbreak investigations in HCS is confirmed by: (i) the
implementation of open-source databases dedicated to HCS
outbreaks only [29]; (ii) the implementation of specific guidelines
for reporting HCS outbreaks [13]; (iii) the increasing number of
systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses which use outbreak
investigations as source of data.
P. aeruginosa outbreaks among immunocompromised patients
represent dangerous events and they may recognize unusual
pathways of transmission, such as contamination of disinfectants
[3,30–31]. In order to avoid the occurrence of new event
additional studies are needed to define the susceptibility of P.
aeruginosa strains to commonly used disinfectants, in particular
triclosan, with special regard to those used in hospital units which
admit frail patients, such as oncohematology units.
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Table 5. Overall epidemiological outcomes at the end of the
outbreak, according to the assumption that case 8 was the
index case and the soap dispenser the actual environmental
reservoir.
Summary of the epidemiologic parameters
Epidemic period 08/03/2007–06/06/2007
No. of exposed susceptible 19
No. of cases 5 (3 confirmed, 2 probable)
No. of fatalities 3
Attack rate (%) 26.3
Fatality rate (%) 60
Source Soap dispenser
Associated factors CVC
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017064.t005
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